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PEOPLE V. HUDSON
f45 C.2d 121; 237 P.2d 497J

[Crim. No. 5688.

In Bank.

Sept. 20, 1955.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. 'PAUL HUDSON, Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Evidence.-Evidence in a homicide case showing,
among other things, that defendant, after he and a truck owner
alighted from the truck which he was driving, hit such owner
on the side of the face with his fist, knocking him to his hnnds
and feet, that defendant kicked him about the head and he
fell to the ground, after which defendant moved him a few
feet away from the side of the road but did not hide the body,
that he then took the victim's purse and drove away in the
victim's truck, and that the body was found three days later,
death having been caused by cerebral concussion and hemorrhage and by a compound fracture of the jaw, is sufficient to
support a finding that defendant committed the homicide in
the perpetration of a robbery and that he is therefore guilty
of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 189.)
[ia, 2bj Id.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error - Instructions.-Failure to instruct the jury in a homicide case that the
killing was not in perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate
robbery if defendant had not formed an intent to rob the
victim until after the fatal blows were struck and he
dragged the victim's body into a ditch constitutes prejudicial
error where such instruction sets forth defendant's only available defense, aside from insanity, to the charge of first degree
murder, where the evidence is not inconsistent with defendant's testimony that his attack on the victim was the result
of a sudden quarrel and that the taking of his property was
an afterthought, and where the evidence is inconsistent with
the theory of a planned robbery and indicates that the crime
was committed by a person whose behavior was generally
erratic and who was at the time at least partially under the
influence of ahohol.
[3] Id.-Burden of Proof.-The burden of proof is on the prosecution in a homicide case to prove defendant guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt j it is not incumbent
on defendant to convince the jury that his version of what
occurred is true.
['] Id.-Bvidence.-Defendant in a homicide case is entitled to be
found guilty of no more than murder of second degree if his
testimony, viewed in the light of other evidence, is sufficient
to create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt of first degree
murder.
•
[1] See Cal.Jur., Homicide, ~ 17.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide,

~

145(5); [2] Homicide,

§ 270; [3] Homicide, § 141; [4] I:Iomicide, § l~ _
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APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County.
Clark Clement, Judge. Reversed.
•Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty, reversed.
Charles W. Jennings, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Miller,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRA YNOR, J.-This appeal is from a judgment imposing
the death penalty following defendant's conviction of first
degree murder.
The following facts are undisputed: At approximately
2 p. m. on July 6, 1954, defendant was drinking beer in
a bar, the Black Cat Cafe, in the town of Stratford. Shortly
thereafter William rruttle came into the bar wearing a distinctive black hat. He and defendant engaged in conversation. At that time defendant had no money and Tuttle
bought him a beer. Between 2 :30 and 3 p. m. defendant and
Tuttle left the bar together, taking four cans of beer with
them. Defendant told the bartender that they were going
for a ride. They were next seen sitting together in Tuttle's
green 1952 Ford pickup truck, which was parked by a clump
of shade trees near the edge of town. Thereafter they went
to Tuttle's cabin, which was located in an agricultural labor
camp outside of Stratford. They remained at the cabin
for half an hour drinking beer before they started back to
town. The drive back was interrupted by Tuttle's wish to
urinate. Both defendant and Tuttle alighted from the truck
at a point along a rural road. Defendant hit Tuttle on the
side of the face with his fist. The blow knocked Tuttle to
his hands and knees, whereupon defendant kicked him about
the head, and he fell to the ground. Defendant moved him a
few feet away from the side of the road but did not hide the
body. He then took Tuttle's purse and drove away in Tuttle's
truck. The body was found three days later. It was in a
"fairly advanced" state of decomposition, but an autopsy
showed that death was caused by cerebral concussion and
hemorrhage and by a compound fracture of the jaw, both
owing to blows about the head and face. In his testimony

at the trial, the autopsy surgeon stated that the concu.s&oD,

I
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hemorrhage, and fracture were combined causes and that
one of them could not be singled out as the sole cause of death.
Within an hour after having ~eft with Tuttle, defendant returned to Stratford driving Tuttle's truck and wearing
Tuttle's black hat. He went into th~ Black Cat Cafe and
paid for the beer that he had purcha.sed on credit earlier in
the day before leaving with Tuttle. He also bought drinks
for everybody in the bar and bought 24 cans of beer and
two hamburgers to take with him. On leaving the Black Cat
Cafe, he went across the street to a grocery store, where he
was known, and bought a pint of whiskey and some luncheon
meat. He put his purchases in Tuttle's truck and started to
drive out of town. He stopped at a service station to buy gas
and oil for the truck. He drove away and had an accident at
the edge of town in which the truck was turned over and his
right foot severely cut. He urged two witnesses to the accident not to call an ambulance or the police and stood talking
with them until his brother arrived and drove him to his
brother's home just outside of Stratford. Defendant stayed
there overnight. On the following day, his brother drove
him to Corcoran where he took a cab to Fresno. After staying
in Fresno overnight, he boarded a bus for Arizona. He
ultimately made his way to EI Paso, Texas, where he called
on the sheriff's office and the highway patrol for help in
entering a hospital to obtain treatment for an infection in
his injured foot. He was apprehended before leaving the
hospital, in which he had registered under his own name,
and returned to Kings County to stand trial on charges of
murder, robbery, and theft of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 503).
Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity. In his testimony at the trial, however, hE' admitted
the robbery and the theft of the vehicle. He also admitted
that he had struck Tuttle in the face with his fist and that
he had kicked him about the head. He explained that he
and Tuttle had been discussing the possibility of defendant's
buying the truck from Tuttle and that on the way back to
Stratford defendant had asked permission to drive in order
"to try it out." Tuttle gave his permission but when they
stopped at the place where the killing occurred they had an
argument over Tuttle's complaint that defendant was driving
too fast and recklessly. Defendant testified that the 'blows
were the result of this argument and that he did not form
an intent to rob until after the attack had ceased: "Mr.
Tuttle iets out of the car 011 the opposite side of the driver.
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1 got out of the ear. I come around to the front of the car
and we got in a little argument there. \V ell like the testimony
said that he was going to pass water so when he started to do
that I hit him and knocked him down. He was down on all
fOll1'S, I knew that I was on parole,· just out of the penitentiary and I knew that would mess me up right there so
I kicked the man and when I kicked him he went on down,
and I decided then 1 got to take his money and get out of
here for 1 haven't got any. So I took his money and from
where I left the man when they found the body it was at
least ten feet from where I left it. The reason I moved the
body from what they say was out from under the wheels
of the back of the car was I wouldn't run over him." (Italics
added.)
In rebuttal, the prosecution offered in evidence a pretrial
confession. Defendant objected to its introduction on the
ground that it was involuntary in that it had been obtained
by the use of a threat by the sheriff of Kings County. Defendant testified that the sheriff threatened to do everything
in his power to send defendant's brother to the penitentiary
unless defendant confessed. Defendant's brother was mentally deficient and had been in a mental institution, and defendant was anxious to shield him. The sheriff denied mak.
ing the threat, however, and the trial judge admitted the
confession. In the confession defendant admitted the robbery,
the theft, and the assault on Tuttle. He also said that he
had formed the intent to rob before he and Tuttle had gone
to the latter's cabin and thus before any blows had been
struck.
On the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, defendant
waived a trial by jury. rrhe only evidence introduced was
the written opinion of the two psychiatrists who were appointed by the court to examine defendant. They agreed
that defendant was legally sane at the time of the crime, and
the court found accordingly.
[1] Even if the contested confession is disregarded, the
foregoing evidence is sufficient to support a finding that defendant committed the homicide in the perpetration of a
robbery, that he was legally sane at the time of the crime,
and that he is therefore guilty of murder in the first degree.
(Pen. Code, § 189; People v. Cutt'nine, 41 Ca1.2d 384, 387 [260
P.2d 16].) [23.] Defendant contends, however, that the trial
-Defenuant was on parole from Hol"uau Prison where he had beea

coAiULed aftel" havlll" beeR collvicted Q! P&BSini 1I.ctitioua

~
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court committed prejudicial error by refusing to i llstruct
the jury on his theory of the case. He offered the following
instruction, wllich the trial cou'tt refused to give:
"If you find that Defendant, PAUL HUDSON had not formed
an intention to rob WILLIAM TUTTLE until after he struck
WILLIAM TUTTLE, dragged his body into the ditch then you
are instructed that WILLIAM TUTTLE was not killed by PAUL
HUDSON in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate the
crime of robbery."
In People v. Carnine, 41 Ca1.2d 384 [260 P.2d 16], the
failure to give such an instruction was held to be prejudicial
error because the defendant had testified that "he never
intended to kill Mr. Rosenbaum and did not decide to take
the property until after the attack had terminated" and
because the other evidence was "not inconsistent with defendant's testimony that his attack on Mr. Rosenbaum was
the result of a sudden quarrel" rather than being the means
of effecting a planned robbery or burglary. (41 Ca1.2d at
388,391; see also People v. Kerr, 37 Ca1.2d 11, 13-14 [229 P.2d
777].) The attorney general contends, however, that defendant's own testimony· demonstrates that the Carnine case
is inapplicable "because [his testimony shows that] the intent
to rob arose after he had knocked Mr. Tuttle down, but before
the termination of his attack upon Mr. Tuttle, i.e., before he
kicked Mr. Tuttle in the face and on the head at the base of
the skull." [Italics added.] Defendant's testimony does not
sustain that contention. In his testimony quoted above defendant explicitly stated that the blow with his fist knocked
-In addition to the testimony quoted above, the People cite the following excerpts: "I hit him. He was fixing to pass water when I hit
him. Q. Then after you hit him he fe1l7 A. He fell down on his
hands and knees. Q. And after that, after he was down, you stated you
kicked him' A. Yes, I kicked him. Q. Then your testimony is, is it not,
that after you had him on the ground you decided to take his property'
A. That is when I actually decided to take his money, is on account that
I was on parole, and I knew that I was messed up anyway, and that's
why I took his money and his car.••• Q. You did not intend to rob him
nntil after he was on the ground,1I.fter you knocked him down 7 A. That's
correct•••• Q. Why did you feel you had to rob him, Mr. Hudson'
A. I didn't have no money and I had to get away from there on account,
you know, if you get in a fight or anything while you are on parole,
parole can be violated and that is the reason I left on account I took
his money and the car, so on account I was on parole I had to gllt out
ot there. Q. Mr. Hudson, when did you intend to rob him' A. I intended to rob the man after I had knocked him down . . . . Q. When did
you first intend to rob the man then' A. After T got llim (lowlI. Q. II. ft(~r
you got him Ilown' A. YC!l, !lir. Q. You didn't intend to lob him uefore
lOU lwocked him dOWlli A. No, sir."
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Tuttle to his hands and knees, that after he "was down on all
fours" defendant kicked him and "he went on down," and
that" I decided then I got to take his money and get out of
here for I haven't got any." [Italics added.] Thus, his testimony is clear that the intent to rob was not formed until
after the attack had ceased and the deceased was lying uneonscious on the ground. We must therefore conclude that
the requested instruction should have been given.
Since defendant admitted that he had attacked Tuttle and
had thereafter stolen his purse and his truck, his only available defense, aside from insanity, to the charge of murder in
the first degree was that set forth in the refused instruction.
Although the jury was not required to believe defendant'8
testimony that he did not decide to steal Tuttle's property
until after the assault was completed (People v. Kerr, supra,
37 Ca1.2d 11, 14), he was nevertheless entitled to have them
properly instructed on the defense raised thereby. (People
v. Carmen, 36 Ca1.2d 768, 772-774 [228 P.2d 281], and cases
cited.)
The other evidence introduced at the trial is not inconsistent
with defendant's testimony that his attack on Tuttle was the
result of a sudden quarrel and that the taking of his property
was an afterthought. The evidence is inconsistent with the
theory of a planned robbery. Defendant did not choose a
victim from whom he could expect to obtain any large amount
of money. He met his victim in a bar where both were known.
Defendant called attention to the fact that they were leaving
together. After the attack, he made no effort to conceal the
body. He returned immediately to the bar driving Tuttle's
truck and wearing his hat. He made a conspicuous display
of having money to spend, which the bartender knew he did
not have before he left with Tuttle. He stopped at a grocery
store where he was known, and at a gasoline station in Stratford. After wrecking the truck, he made no effort to run
away but chatted with two witnesses to the wreck until his
brother arrived and drove him home. Had he planned to
rob Tuttle and then killed him to prevent his identification as
a robber, it is unlikely that he would leave a trail so easily
followed.
As in the Carnine case, "The evidence presents a picture
of a crime committed by a person whose behavior was generally erratic and who was at the time at least partially
under the influence of alcohol. The crime had few, if any,
of the indicia of careful planning. Under these circum-
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stances it was a close question whether defendant first decided to rob [the victim] and then limed him in the perpetration of that robbery or first attacked him without premeditation and only thereafter decided to steal his property.
·'It cannot be inferred from the fact that the jury brought
in a verdict of murder of the first rather than of the second
degree that it decided this question against defendant. The
instructions· on second degree murder carefully pointed out
that murder could not be of the second degree if it was
committed in the perpetration of a robbery or burglary. Thus
these instructions referred the jury to those defining murder
committed in the perpetration of a robbery or burglary, and
as pointed out above, none of the latter instructions explained
to the jury defendant's only defense to the charge of murder
committed in the perpetration of a robbery.
[3] "In determining whether the error was prejudicial, it
bears emphasis that the burden was on the prosecution to
prove defendant guilty of murder of the first degree beyond
a reasonable doubt. It was not incumbent upon defendant to
convince the jury that his version of what occurred was true.
[4] He was entitled to be found guilty of no more than
murder of the second degree if his testimony viewed in the
light of the other evidence was sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt of murder of the first degree."
(41 Ca1.2d at 391-392.) [2b] Under these circumstances,
the refusal of the court to instruct the jury on defendant's
theory of the case substantially and prejudicially affected the
rights of defendant. Accordingly, a reversal is necessary to
prevent a miscarrh:.ge of justice.
The judgment of conviction of murder of the first degree
is reversed.
L

Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., ooneurred.

..
-The instructions given in the present case were substantially the
laDle .. those given in the Carnine case. (See 41 Cal.2d at 388-389.)

